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THE VALUE OF WARSHIP ATTRIBUTES
FOR MISSILE COMBAT
Wayne P. Hughes, Jr.




A methodology is introduced with which to compare the
military worth of warship combat capabilities. It is based
on two principles. First, a simple salvo model is necessary
for exploratory analysis of modern characteristics. Second,
the "fractional exchange ratio" is a robust way to compare
equal-cost configurations of naval forces, even though we
cannot know in advance how and where the warships will be
fought
.
The methodology is justified three ways: By tracing the
evolution of elemental naval force-on-force models since
1902. By a summary of studies covering model exposition,
verification and application, and the collection of battle
data. And by illustration with important conclusions from
parametric analysis, among which are:
(1) The risk of unstable circumstances grows as combat
power of a force grows relative to its survivability.
("Stable" means the persistence of victory by the side
with the greater combat potential.)
(2) Numerical advantage is the force attribute that is
consistently the most advantageous. For example, if A*s
forces are twice B's, then for combat parity, B's unit
striking power, staying power and defensive firepower
must be twice that of A's units.
With regard to staying power, the well-known advantage of
design balance has been lost in modern warships, and weak
staying power is a root source of observable instability.
Also, staying power is the ship design element least
affected by the particulars of a battle, including poor
tactics
.
THE VALUE OF WARSHIP ATTRIBUTES IN MISSILE COMBAT
I. INTRODUCTION
Background
Staying power, the ability of a ship to absorb hits and continue
fighting, is a major attribute of warships. Developing ways and
means to enhance staying power is a matter of detailed engineering
design. The naval architect is faced with two dilemmas. First, if
the history of combat at sea is any guide, when similar quantities
of ordnance strike similar warships, the variation in the amount of
damage is quite large. Second, even if one could predict with a
high degree of accuracy the effect of, say, hits by Exocet missiles
on a DDG-51, the difficult question would still remain: What is the
military worth of staying power to the DDG-51 relative to its other
combat attributes? For both reasons, the warship designer who knows
how to toughen a ship does not know whether doing so will pay off
in battle and be worth the cost.
Knowing the value of staying power and other warship attributes,
however, has always been of central importance to a navy. There was
a time when the relative balance between warship firepower, staying
power, speed and endurance was debated publicly, energetically and
with the knowledge that:
You cannot have everything. If you attempt it, you will
lose everthing. . .On a given tonnage. . .there cannot be the
highest speed, and the heaviest battery, and the thickest
armor, and longest coal endurance. [Mahan, 1911, p. 44].
A country can, or will, pay only so much for its war fleet.
That amount of money means so much aggregate tonnage. How
shall that tonnage be allotted? And especially, how shall
the total tonnage invested in armored ships be divided?
Will you have a very few big ships, or more numerous medium
ships? [Mahan, 1898, p. 37]
The case for staying power in the form of armor ended with the
atomic bomb. We would have, we thought, one ship sunk with every
hit; survivability would have to come from other means. As the
threat of nuclear war wanes, corresponding interest in staying
power has not been reborn. The U. S. Navy has enjoyed the luxury of
contributing to decision on land while being itself relatively free
from attacks from the land. But the sanctuary of the sea seems less
secure today, along with the prospect of taking hits while fighting
close against the littorals.
The problem is now, as it was when Mahan wrote at the turn of the
century, what is the proper mix of attributes in a modern warship?
We will wish to look briefly at the analysis of his day for ways to
correct the lack of analysis in our own. We will see that the
analysis then was framed by naval officers not merely as a single
ship design question but one of balance in a fighting formation,
for there was a trade-off then, as there is now, between warship
strength and number of ships.
The methodology we propose for addressing the question of balance
between warship attributes is deceptively simple. It rests on the
same premise which guided naval officers who attempted to study
warship attributes with combat models at the turn of the century:
engineering detail adds no insight until the major attributes are
settled by examining their military worth in a force-on-force
context.
But the simple salvo model introduced in Section II does not look
like the force-on-force models developed then because combat now
with missiles is different from combat then with guns.
Study Objective
The primary purpose of this study is to offer a methodology to
study modern surface warfare in a form suitable to help put the
value of a modern surface warship's staying power in context of
overall "military worth."
A salvo model of combat is developed to compare staying power with
offensive firepower and various defensive measures that reduce
susceptibilility to damage. The model and its attributes are first
exhibited in Section II and further discussed in Section VII. The
analytical role and value of other attributes are specified, most
notably the capacity to acquire tactical information about the
enemy. An embellished model is in Section VIII.
Much of the study is intended to trace the pedigree of the salvo
model, including its deep roots in analysis by naval officers. The
salvo model is only new and original because naval combat with
missiles is new, different and untested in fleet actions. Complex
computer simulations tend to obscure the essential structure of a
modern sea battle, and so mask some important implications for
warship design and the significance of staying power.
While this paper's central purpose is methodological, nevertheless
there are substantive conclusions. At this juncture the reader is
well advised to turn directly to Sections X and XI, the Conclusions
and Recommendations, for the following reasons:
o If the model is sound, then Sections X and XI serve as an
Executive Summary of implications. Some of these suggest the need
for new directions in U. S. warship construction.
o Like every analytical tool, the methodology has advantages
and limitations. The reader may wish to navigate the study more
attentively in light of the destination.
o The reader will find that the conclusions are based on
exercising the model with parametric inputs. Analysis with "real,"
specific warship design characteristics lies in the future. Full
value accrues when a reader wishes to experiment with the salvo
model himself. That will take a grasp of detail.
Organization
The remainder of the Introduction justifies the methodology used in
the study and denies the suitability of more detailed simulations.
After the Introduction the paper is organized as follows:
Section II: States the Basic Equation of modern salvo warfare
between surface warships employing missiles, or between warships
and attacking aircraft. Defines Fractional Exchange Ratio, or FER,
which is used to compare the relative military worth of warship
attributes.
Section III: A section for clearing underbrush. Describes the
original motivation behind the salvo equations as a tactical,
rather than a design, planning aid. Confronts the model validation
issue as it applies to descriptive models for exploratory analysis.
Points out some salient reasons why force-on-force models of ground
combat have validated poorly in order to show that these reasons do
not apply to naval combat.
Section IV: Definitions and Symbology. Largely follows the
nomenclature of aircraft survivability developed by R. E. Ball
[1985] and ship survivability now in preparation by Ball and
Calvano [1992]. Their terminology is thought to be the best blend
of many in use, but I have had to include a few additions. Not for
casual reading, Section IV is essential for understanding and
profitable manipulation of the salvo equations. At the end is a
summary of most symbols used in Sections V through IX.
Section V: The basic equation for continuous fire. Developed
first in 1902; still appropriate for rifled naval ordnance.
Section VI: The evolution of "salvo fire" in the 20th Century.
We see a single equation form, having changing interpretations and
applications.
Section VII: The modern missile combat equation itself.
Section VIII: The important embellishments to the salvo
equation; they are simple in mathematical structure and profound in
their operational significance. In most instances the manipulation
of the basic equation is mathematically tantamount to the
manipulation of the embellished equation. The embellished model's
primary value is to show some seldom-treated tactical factors that
vastly alter combat results.
Section XI: A catalogue and summary of fourteen pertinent
studies of naval combat that have influenced this paper.
Section X: Conclusions
Section XI: Recommendations
Design Criteria for Exploratory Analysis
We start with these premises:
o The best measure of a warship's productivity, or military
worth, is the quantity of accurately delivered lethality, or
ordnance, over the combat life of the warship.
o The best measure of naval force productivity is similar. It
is the quantity of accurately delivered lethality over the combat
life of a group of warships fighting in a concerted way.
The measures are similar to the U. S. Arms Control and Disarmament
Agency's nuclear weapon exchange models which seek means of stable
deterrence by avoiding forces that are cost-efficient in terms of
throw weight but are susceptible to an enemy first strike.
Both measures of effectiveness involve facts about the enemy that
are inherently unknowable. It seems self-evident that a combat
simulation, no matter how comprehensive and rich in detail, has
little or no predictive power, because one does not know in advance
what inputs to use. In such circumstances, some form of what has
been called exploratory modeling [The RAND Corporation, e. g.,
Bankes, 1992] is appropriate. The modern way of analysis, including
RAND's, is to use computer power in rather complicated simulations.
The approach herein is the opposite. In the spirit of naval officer
analysts like Chase, Fiske, and Baudry, some of whose models will
be introduced in Section IV, this study employs the simplest
mathematical model that appears to capture the essential dynamics
of modern force-on-force war at sea. This approach is also in
keeping with the highly utilitarian methods espoused by Morse and
Kimball [1951, pp. 9-10, 77-80, 110-121], among others.
Since a return to simplicity in this study runs counter to a trend
toward more and more complicated simulations, and since it is
contrary to much engineering analysis, including detailed models to
study warship vulnerability, we will take space to elaborate with
one of the studies summarized in Section IX, by T. R. Beall [1990].
Beall shows that a simple naval combat model can be validated from
historical battles, but only if one knows and applies inputs that
were observed in the battles . Besides actions by the enemy and
damage effects that are unpredictable, other critical values noted
by Beall were:
o Hit probabilities of ordnance delivered (unexpectedly low in
many cases)
.
o When and how many warships in the force opened fire and for
how long.
o The distribution of fire among targets.
o Whether a force was surprised or otherwise placed at a
tactical disadvantage by the enemy.
The purpose of Beall's thesis was to assess the validatity of two
simple combat equations for continuous and salvo fire. His results
show two contrasting things, both of which are nearly always true
about naval combat models.
On one hand, when the appropriate combat model describes only a
small number of essential features in an engagement, it will be
validated by historical engagements a posteriori , if the small
number of inputs correspond to what transpired in the battle:
namely, the ships that actually fought, the correct open and cease
fire times of fighting units, the correct targeting of warships,
and the actual hit probabilities and expected-value damage of the
ordnance. If one knows what happened, then one can reproduce the
important features of the battle with a simple, but appropriate,
model.
On the other hand, Beall's analysis shows that if one does not know
what happened he cannot reproduce a battle, even if he uses a model
of any complexity and level of detail whatsoever. Its predictive
power a priori is nil, since few of the vital inputs to the model
can be known in advance.
The analytical approach of this study therefore rests on two
pillars. First, we are free to use a simple, but appropriate
exploratory model of modern naval salvo warfare that is sufficient
to examine and compare the combat value of warship attributes. By
appropriate is meant that the most essential phenomena are modeled
in a fashion similar to the combat activities themselves. Second,
we must find a utilitarian way to compare attributes even though we
cannot know in advance how and where the warships will fight or the
competence of the tacticians who will employ them in combat.
Other Approaches Using Simple Mathematics of Combat
Two common analytic approaches to exploratory, or descriptive,
force-on-force analysis that serve as precedents are Lanchester
equations and stochastic duels, both of which are well developed
and have extensive literature. See for example, J. G. Taylor [1983]
for the former and DARCOM Pamphlet 706-101 [1977], C. J. Thomas
[1966], or C. J. Ancker [1982] for the latter. Neither approach is
suitable for modern naval combat because neither captures the
essential elements of modern naval combat with salvoes of missiles
as the principal ordnance.
A third, less well known, approach is by Theodore C. Taylor. His
unpublished article, "A Salvo Exchange Model for Modern Tactical
Conditions" [1990], is interesting, very much to the subject, and
insightful in many respects. Taylor treats Offensive and Defensive
combat power as a fraction of enemy capability. He defines:
EOB as the fraction of side A's tactical potential destroyed
by B ' s salvo in the absence of defensive measures by A.
EDA as the fraction of EOB eliminated by A's defense, so that
the fraction of A's combat power remaining after B's salvo is
FAR = 1 - [EOB (l - EDA )]
FBR is defined symmetrically for A's salvo effectiveness against B.
The Taylor formulation can be manipulated with some interesting
analytical results, but the use of fractions sometimes conceals
important effects and is not trustworthy for the objectives of this
study.
REFERENCES [Complete citations are in the Bibliography]
Ancker, C. J. , Jr. , One-on-One Stochastic Duels , 1982
Ball, R. E. , The Fundamentals of Aircraft Combat Survivability
Analysis and Design , 1985
and C. N. Calvano, The Fundamentals of Surface Ship Combat
Survivability Analysis and Design , 1992 Draft
Bankes, S. C, "Exploratory Modeling and the Use of Simulation for
Policy Analysis," 1992
Beall, T. R., "The Development of a Naval Battle Model and Its
Validation Using Historical Data," 1990
Mahan, A. T. , The Lessons of the War With Spain , 1899
,
Naval Strategy, Compared and Contrasted With the Principles
and Practices of Military Operations , 1911
Morse, P. M.
,
and G. E. Kimball, Methods of Operations Research ,
1950
Taylor, J. G. , Lanchester Models of Warfare . 1983
Taylor, T. C. , "A Salvo Exchange Model for Modern Tactical
Conditions," Revision 5, 1990
Thomas, C. J., Military Operations Research Course: Selected Topics
of Military Operations , 1966
U. S. Army DARCOM, Engineering Design Handbook , 1977
II. THE BASIC EQUATIONS
The Salvo Model of Naval Combat
The basic salvo equations are:




A = number of units in force A.
B = number of units in force B.
a = number of well aimed missiles fired by each A unit.
/3 = number of well aimed missiles fired by each B unit.
aj = number of hits by B*s missiles needed to put one A 00A.
b, = number of hits by A's missiles needed to put one B 00A.
a 3 = number of well aimed missiles destroyed by each A.
b3 = number of well aimed missiles destroyed by each B.
AA = number of units in force A 00A from B's salvo
AB = number of units in force B 00A from A's salvo
Observe a fundamental assumption that AA and AB are measured in
warships put out of action, not ships sunk. The choice is basic
because the amount of ordnance required to sink a ship is on the
order of two to four times as much as would be required to achieve
a firepower kill. We take the proper tactical aim to be to put all
enemy ships out of action so that they pose no threat, after which
the ships may be sink without risk. Ships sunk is a measure of
strategic success, in that a ship sunk cannot be repaired to become
a threat later.
The Measure of Effectiveness
To overcome the problem of the lack of a priori information about
the employment in battle of a force, we offer as a suitable measure
of comparative mission effectiveness what is sometimes called the
Fractional Exchange Ratio (FER) . It compares the fraction of two
equal-cost forces destroyed by the other under the supposition that
they exchange salvoes. Mathematically the ratio of fractional
losses after A and B exchange salvoes is:
FER = AB/B
AA/A
When the FER is greater than one, side A has reduced B by a greater
fraction that B has reduced A and so A has won in the sense that it
will have surviving units when B is eliminated. When the FER is
less than one, side B has the advantage of the exchange.
Value of Salvo Analysis in Context
Results using realistic values in the salvo equations are merely
indicative. Other modeling, tests, discussions and interpretations
must follow before design decisions are reached.
As an example, any conclusions about staying power of a warship in
missile combat against enemy ships or aircraft can be expected to
understate its value, because unlike missile striking power and SAM
defensive power, staying power also contributes to survivability
against mines, torpedoes and gunfire.
As a second example, the salvo model does not explicitly account
for weapon range and scouting coverage. A warship whose missiles
outrange the enemy's, when supported by reliable means to detect,
track and target every approaching enemy, is unassailable as long
as it can carry out its mission without closing the enemy in
offshore, blue water operations. As will be evident, scouting is a
crucial ingredient of success. The salvo eguations cannot be used
effectively without realistic inputs for the value of aA and a B , the
scouting processes of both sides. Scouting effectiveness is added
to the eguations explicitly in Section VIII, Salvo Equation
Embellishments .
Exploratory analysis using simple force-on-force models such as the
salvo model is no substitute for the usual design analysis, but
exploratory analysis is a necessary antecedent at the beginning and
a supplement near the end of the design process. At the outset it
establishes relationships that will not otherwise be grasped—as
for example the special value of staying power when tactics are
faulty, the value of scouting when conditions are unstable, and the
value of numbers under all circumstances. At the conclusion, the
simple model will serve as a highly transparent way of seeing why
select features seem to provide balance. Presently some exploratory
analysis of the DDV designs may be enlightening and confirmatory.
III. APPLICATION, INVESTIGATION AND CORROBORATION
Prior Model Application For Study of Operations
The salvo model was developed to explore and explain the tactical
interactions and relationships of modern missile combat. It was
first introduced in stark form in Chapter 10 of Fleet Tactics:
Theory and Practice [1986]. The motivation was the same as that
which lay behind the developments by J. V. Chase, B. A. Fiske, M.
Osipov, A. Baudry, and F. W. Lanchester himself of force-on-force
gunfire equations, often referred to collectively as Lanchester
equations. It was apparent that continuous gunfire models were
inapt for missile warfare. When the suitable model form is used,
the equations serve their expository purpose well, communicating a
better understanding of the value and limitations of combat power
in different forms and under various tactical conditions.
This was the same motivation that lay behind the theory and
development of stochastic duels (essentially one-on-one combat) in
World War II. The various mathematical constructions enlightened
wartime tactics without any baggage of formal validation. That is
not to say that wartime analysts had no concern for accuracy. They
understood that though precision would be elusive, analysis could
still be used to make major improvements in sensor and weapon
employment. Accuracy and predictive power were relative things.
What was useful was usually apparent and what was useful was put to
work.
Recent Salvo Model Application and Validation
The salvo equation form was initially developed in the same spirit:
the aim was to improve tactical understanding. Utilitarian
investigation and model corroboration were pursued concurrently by
thesis students at the Naval Postgraduate School without much
regard for any distinction between the two objectives. Some of
these studies are summarized in Section IX. I have no hesitation to
endorse the salvo formulation to clarify tactical thought. Whether
it will be equally useful for exploratory analysis as the first
step in ship design and procurement cannot be proven until it is
tried, but that is my conjecture and hope.
Model validation is not a very useful concept, for combat model
"validation' 1 is never conclusive. It is better to substitute the
notion of "corroboration," which means to strengthen or support
with evidence and authority. Corroboration implies a never ending
process. As Clayton J. Thomas wrote [1989],
Validation efforts, the many arduous endeavors to make our
models better and more useful, are absolutely essential. . .
We must realize, however, that our validation efforts will
not result in absolutely validated models. . . Model use will
remain conditional, dependent on the decisions to be made and
the resources available for study. The user of a model will
10
continue to have the responsibility for its use.
Contrast With Ground Combat Models
The U. S. Army has been more assiduous than the Navy in attempting
to validate its models of combat with historical battle data. There
is a broad consensus among analysts that the Lanchester square law
form does not validate well against data, either from exercises or
historical battles. This need not deter the use of continuous fire
or salvo fire models for the study of naval combat. The reason is
that square law conditions rarely hold for ground combat but
usually do for naval combat. In ground combat the defender secures
a unit firepower advantage by employing terrain advantageously in
prepared positions. Unless the defender advantage is taken into
account in model validation, a square law model of ground combat
will not conform with historical battle data. The problem vanishes
at sea because there is no corresponding advantage of terrain or
fortification. Secondly, the Lanchester model, which measures
casualties produced by fire, inherently presumes that the only
significant achievement of fire is casualties, and so victory must
be expressed in casualties. But one of the most important effects
of firepower in ground combat is suppression of enemy fire and
movement, and a commonly observed cause of mission success is the
domination or control of the enemy without severe attrition. There
is no counterpart in naval combat (although Appendix A cites an
example of suppression as an exception that proves the rule.) At
sea, battles are won by putting enemy warships out of action and
victory is measured by warships sunk. The first mathematical models
of combat were developed by naval officers for the analysis of
gunfire between opposing warships because the conditions in the
model fit the conditions of combat. This is still the case today.
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IV. DEFINITIONS AND GENERAL ASSUMPTIONS
Definitions UNDERLINED are followed by mathematical symbols which
appear in the models of combat processes represented in the study.
COMBAT UNIT
1. A ship or aircraft capable of delivering firepower.
2. An actual or notional warship/aircraft type comprising a
homogeneous force.
3. A standard or benchmark unit in a heterogeneous force.
COMBAT FORCE
A group of COMBAT UNITS that operate and fight in concert.
FORCE STRENGTH A, B
1. The number of UNITS in a homogeneous COMBAT FORCE on sides A
or B, designated A or B respectively.
2. The total value of a heterogeneous FORCE is a weighted sum of
the individual UNIT values measured against a standard unit, e.g.,




1. A single unit of ordnance, e. g., shell, torpedo, missile.
2. A notional unit of ordnance in a homogeneous force, e. g. , an
HC-type 8" shell, a Mark XII 21" torpedo, or a Harpoon missile.
3
.
A standard or benchmark unit of ordnance in a heterogeneous
force.
HIT
Verb: To deliver an accurate SHOT to a UNIT
Noun: 1. A SHOT that inflicts damage proportionate to l/a, or 1/bj
of a target UNIT'S STAYING POWER. 2. The fundamental unit of
measurement of FIREPOWER, FIGHTING POWER, STRIKING POWER and COMBAT
POWER.
SEEN TARGET
An enemy COMBAT UNIT that is detected, tracked and targetable. By
targetable is meant a UNIT at which a SHOT may be fired with a
utilitarian ACCURACY OF FIRE.
ACCURATE SHOT, OR GOOD SHOT
A SHOT that is so well aimed that it will HIT a SEEN TARGET,
absent actions by the target to avoid it. ACCURATE, or GOOD, SHOT
must in some cases be defined with respect to specific aspect and
motion of the target.
ACCURACY OF FIRE 77 A , 7T B
The probability that a SHOT fired against a target will be an
ACCURATE SHOT.
COMBAT KILL, OR MISSION KILL
Verb: To put out of action [OOA] ; to render impotent for the
12
duration of an engagement.
Noun: The state of a COMBAT UNIT that is OOA and rendered
harmless, not necessarily sunk, but with no COMBAT POWER remaining.
(COMBAT POWER is defined below.)
OFFENSIVE POWER
A casual expression of FIREPOWER, FIGHTING POWER, STRIKING POWER
or COMBAT POWER as appropriate to the circumstances.
OVERKILL
A casual word for the excess or surplus of OFFENSIVE POWER in
hits on targets that exceed the number necessary for COMBAT KILL.
OVERKILL is a valuable, but not always desirable, margin to cover
errors or miscalculations or chance. It is also a measure of damage
beyond COMBAT KILL toward a sinking.
FIREPOWER Unit: a 2 , b 2 Force: a 2A, b2B
1. Of a COMBAT UNIT, the rate at which SHOTS are fired by the
UNIT, whether ACCURATE or not,
a. per unit of time for a stream of SHOTS, called continuous
fire
.
b. per salvo for a pulse or bundle of SHOTS tightly spaced in
time relative to the interval between pulses; called salvo fire.
2. Of a FORCE, the rate at which SHOTS are fired by all UNITS,
a. per unit time for continuous fire.
b. per tightly spaced pulse for salvo fire.
Firepower is frequently but unwisely used as a basis for comparison
with other attributes.
FIGHTING, OR STRIKING, POWER Unit: a, /3 Force: aA, /SB
1. Of a COMBAT UNIT, the number of ACCURATE SHOTS fired by it,
a. per period of time for continuous fire
b. per tightly spaced pulse for salvo fire.
2. Of a FORCE, the number of ACCURATE SHOTS fired by all UNITS,
a. per period of time for continuous fire
b. per tightly spaced pulse for salvo fire.
FIGHTING POWER is FIREPOWER diminished for ACCURACY OF FIRE. Also
called STRIKING POWER for carrier air or missile strike.
STAYING POWER Unit: a,, b, Force: ajA, b,B
The number of HITS that can be absorbed by a UNIT or FORCE before
COMBAT POWER (equivalently , FIREPOWER and FIGHTING POWER) is
reduced to zero for the remainder of the engagement. It is the
converse of vulnerability.
FIGHTING STRENGTH
A composite value of FIREPOWER and SURVIVABILITY (defined below)
that suitably represents deliverable firepower over the combat life
of a UNIT or FORCE. For example, F. W. Lanchester showed that for
continuous fire under square law conditions, what he called
FIGHTING STRENGTH of a FORCE could be represented by aA 2 or 0B 2 ;
and for linear law conditions by aA or /SB. It will be seen that the
13
FIGHTING STRENGTH of a naval FORCE using continuous fire with
FIGHTING POWER q or (3 and STAYING POWER a, or b, can be represented
by a^A 2 or b,/3B 2 .
The object of this study is to seek suitable measures of UNIT and
FORCE FIGHTING STRENGTH for salvo fire so that various attributes
of warships can be compared.
SCOUTING EFFECTIVENESS aA , a B
The degradation of FIGHTING POWER, measured in hits per salvo,
lost due to imperfect detection or tracking of enemy targets.
SCOUTING EFFECTIVENESS is a number between and 1 that is the
difference between the number of ACCURATE SHOTS delivered with
optimal knowledge of enemy composition and location and the number
of ACCURATE SHOTS delivered with the existing information.
SUSCEPTIBILITY
The degree to which a target is impotent to take action against
ACCURATE SHOTS by the enemy. Total susceptibility results when the
target can take no effective actions of maneuver, deception, or
hard or softkill defense, so that the number of HITS equal the
number of ACCURATE SHOTS.
VULNERABILITY
The ease with which a target may be FIREPOWER KILLED (put out of
action) by enemy HITS. The converse of VULNERABILITY is STAYING
POWER.
KILLABILITY
A composite of SUSCEPTIBILITY and VULNERABILITY.
SURVIVABILITY
The mathematical complement of KILLABILITY. A measure of all
defensive actions, including design actions, that reduce
SUSCEPTIBILITY and VULNERABILITY; i.e., that reduce damage and its
effects
.
COUNTERACTION or DEFENSIVE POWER
A composite of all defensive actions to reduce SUSCEPTIBILITY to
HITS by the enemy. COUNTERACTIONS comprise COUNTERFIRE, SEDUCTION,
EVASION, and DISTRACTION.
COUNTERFIRE or HARDKILL COUNTERACTION
Unit: a 3 , b 3 Force: a 3A, b3B
Weapon fire by a target to destroy enemy SHOTS. COUNTERFIRE is
measured by the number of enemy SHOTS destroyed before they HIT.
SOFTKILL COUNTERACTIONS
SEDUCTION Force: a4 , b4
The process of causing ACCURATE SHOTS to miss when COUNTERFIRE
has failed, e.g., by seduction chaff. SEDUCTION is treated as
equally effective against all GOOD SHOTS in a salvo. It is a
multiplier applied to COMBAT POWER (defined below) taking values
between and 1. The value of a 4 or b4 may or may not be
proportional to the number of surviving targets exercising this
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mode of softkill defense, as appropriate.
EVASION Force: a4 , b4
A process of maneuver to cause GOOD SHOTS to miss. Also design
qualities of low-observability that cause GOOD SHOTS to miss.
EVASION is treated as equally effective against all GOOD SHOTS in
a salvo of, notably, non-homing torpedoes. Mathematically it
affects results in the same way as SEDUCTION, and so the same
symbol is applied over the same range of values.
DISTRACTION Force: p A , p B
A process of causing ACCURATE SHOTS to miss before COUNTERFIRE
has its effect. DISTRACTION is treated as equally effective against
all SHOTS (GOOD or not) in a salvo. It is a multiplier applied to
aA or a B . The value of p may or may not be proportional to the
number of surviving targets exercising this mode of softkill
defense, as appropriate.
COMBAT POWER PA = aA - b 3B , P B = 0B - a 3A in hits/ salvo
The STRIKING POWER of a FORCE minus the total hits eliminated by
COUNTERACTIONS of the target FORCE. COMBAT POWER cannot be defined
or measured except against a specific enemy FORCE and the
COUNTERACTIONS it takes to diminish the STRIKING POWER against it.
Note: The full effect of COMBAT POWER includes the suppression
and demoralization of the enemy, but these are treated as of
secondary importance in naval combat. For a discussion of the major
effects in ground combat, see Hughes [1992].
DEFENDER ALERTNESS <5 A , S B
The extent to which a target UNIT fails to take defensive actions
up to its designed combat potential, due to unreadiness or
inattention caused by faulty EMCON or condition of readiness. It is
normally a multiplier of a 3 or b 3 with values between and 1.
SKILL, OR TRAINING EFFECTIVENESS T A , T B
The degree to which a firing or target UNIT does not reach its
designed combat potential, due inadequate training, organization or
motivation.
COMMAND AND CONTROL
Command and control is a function of command, a process that
governs FORCES in a battle, and a system of people and material
that perform the function by carrying out the process. It is the
command-control (CC) process that is of interest in this study.
Since CC governs very nearly all combat actions, its effect must be
treated as a modifier of any value in the COMBAT POWER equation. If
not readily apparent, it is easily shown that A's CC can diminish
his number of participating UNITS, A; his UNIT STRIKING POWER, a 2 ;
his UNIT COUNTERFIRE, a 3 ; or his SOFTKILL COUNTERACTIONS, p, or a4 ;
since STAYING POWER, a,, is to a large extent inherent in ship
design, a CC deficiency probably has least effect on a,. Since the
definitions are structured to represent performance with ideal CC,
CC is always a factor deflator, never a force multiplier.
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COMBAT WORK AB = PA /b,, AA = PB /aj, in ships out of action/salvo
The number of UNITS put OOA by a salvo or a period of continuous
fire. WORK may also be the accumulated UNITS put OOA after a series
of salvo exchanges.
COMBAT RESULT B[T] = B[0] - AB , A[T] = A[0] - AA
The conditions existing on both sides at a time T after the
battle commenced (time 0) . The COMBAT RESULT at time T is the FORCE
STRENGTH remaining after subtracting enemy WORK done by that time.
COMBAT OUTCOME
A single-valued measure of the final conditions, or states, of
both FORCES when the battle is over. An exchange ratio, AB/AA, is
a common measure of OUTCOME, but in this study the FRACTIONAL
EXCHANGE RATIO, defined below, is the preferred MOE for comparing
the value of warship attributes.
FRACTIONAL EXCHANGE RATIO FER = AB/B
AA/A
COMBAT OUTCOME measured as the ratio of the fraction of each
force remaining.
When the FER is greater than 1, then side A is winning; when the
FER is less than 1, then B is winning, in that the winning side
will have FORCES with COMBAT POWER remaining when the enemy is
impotent. There are pathological exceptions in which both sides'
COMBAT POWER is zero, suggesting a draw, but if one side suffers
more overkill (computationally negative FORCES remaining) than the
other, then the implication is that it has suffered more personnel
casualties, greater damage beyond the point of COMBAT KILL, and
more ships sunk or sinking.
General Assumptions
1. A warship's staying power, a, or b, , is the number of standard
sized or notional hits required to put it out of action (OOA) , not
to sink it. Ships OOA, not ships sunk, measures work accomplished,
AA or AB, by an enemy salvo.
2. A damaged unit's remaining staying power, a, or b1# and
firepower, a 2 or b 2 , degrade linearly with (in direct proportion to)
hits received, up to the point when the unit is OOA.
3. Counterfire (from area and point defense systems) is essentially
a subtractive process, such that no shot will survive and hit up to
the point that the defenses are saturated, after which all good
shots will hit.
4. Countermeasures other than counterfire are equally effective
against every good shot with a constant probability, a4 or b4 , and
the countermeasures take effect after counterfire is applied.
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SUMMARY OF DEFINITIONS AND SYMBOLS
FORCE STRENGTH
FIREPOWER Unit: a 2 , b 2
ACCURACY OF FIRE
FIGHTING OR STRIKING POWER
Unit: a,
STAYING POWER Unit: a,, b,
SCOUTING EFFECTIVENESS
COUNTERFIRE, Hardkill Counteraction 01





DEFENDER ALERTNESS <5 A , 6 h
TRAINING EFFECTIVENESS T A , T B
COMBAT POWER, P A = aA - b,B, P b = /SB - a 3A in hits/salvo
COMBAT WORK AB = PA /b 1# AA = P B /a, in ships put OOA per salvo
COMBAT RESULTS: B[T] = B[0]-AB, A[T] = A[0]-AA, in ships not OOA
FRACTIONAL EXCHANGE RATIO: AB/B
AA/A
FIGHTING STRENGTH: Varies with the combat mode; an index of the
worth of a force in combat.
A, B






Force: a 3A, b3B
Force: a 4 / b4
Force: a 4 » b4
Force: Ps> Pb
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V. CONTINOUS FIRE EQUATIONS
CHASE EQUATION. Developed by Lieutenant (later Rear Admiral) J. V.
Chase in 1902 and presented to Cdr. W. McCartey Little for
calculating battle outcomes in Naval War College war games. His
paper was classified Confidential and not declassified until 1972.
See Fiske [1905, 1988]
The equations solved by Chase have been modified so that the
terminology and symbology conform with this work. His original
derivation appears in toto in Appendix C to Fiske [1988].
Assumptions
1. Fighting power is delivered in a continuous stream of shellfire.
2. All ships on the same side, A or B, have identical unit fighting
power, a or (3, and staying power, a
:
or b,.
3. The value of unit fighting power is constant, i.e., it does not
change because of a change in target range, target aspect, spotting
effectiveness, or demoralization.
4. "Square law" conditions apply: every engaged ship is able to
fire at every engaged enemy ship, and as soon as a ship is out of
action the fact is known and fire is shifted to a ship with
fighting power remaining.
Force-on-Force Differential Equations for the instantaneous rate at
which units are being put out of action at any time t: Combat Work
done by the enemy.
dBft) = aA(t) dA(t) = Bh(t) [1]
dt b, dt a,
State Equation For Results at Any Time, T
aa,[A(0) 2 - A(T) 2 ] = /3b,[B(0) 2 - B(T) 2 ] [2]
Fighting Strengths :
If aa,A 2 > then /3b,B 2 , A will win a battle of annihilation.
[3]
If /SbjB 2 > then aa,A2 , B will win.
Model-based Conclusions
1. From Equation [3] it is seen that if there are twice as many
units on one side as on the other, then for parity each unit of the
force with the smaller number of units must be twice as strong in
fighting power and twice as strong in staying power as the
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numerically larger force.
2. From Equation [2] it is seen that equal increases in fighting
power and staying power contribute equally to the fighting strength
of a warship.
Discussion . With equation [1] we compute Combat Work done, i.e.,
losses to each side. Lanchester computed Combat Results, i.e., the
forces remaining. Consistent with the salvo equations in this paper
I have retained Chase's formulation of the pair of force-on-force
equations. As they have no minus sign in front of the right-hand
terms, they show not results but Work achieved. I have written the
state equation solution in Lanchester fashion, which is the Result
at any time T, rather than Work at time T.
The Chase formulation computes losses measured in ships and can be
used to explore the value of staying power, as he wished to do. The
Lanchester form can only evaluate the aggregate of total forces
remaining.
Retrospectively in 1921 Chase wrote the following about his purpose
in 1902.
Some years ago when I was a member of the War College
Staff, there was considerable discussion among the members
of the staff as to the value of concentration of fire. Most
of the statements pro and con were couched in vague general
terms ... "glittering generalities." [I] sought some more
tangible expression of the advantages to be derived from
concentration. .. the term "unit of destruction" is a
quantity that does not admit of exact definition but it is
readily seen that it serves as a measure of both the
offensive and defensive qualities of a ship. By "unit of
destruction delivered" by a ship is not meant the units
leaving the muzzles of the battery of that ship but "unit
delivered" ... in this way the relative marksmanship of the
contending forces may be taken into account.
For example, let there be eight ships originally on each
side and let one ship on one side be masked so the m = 8
and n = 7. Then the eight ships will destroy the seven
ships and will have the equivalent of vT5 (nearly four)
intact ships with which to engage the remaining one intact
ship... it will be seen that after destroying this one
intact ship there will remain Vl4 . In other words by
blanking one ship [ temporarily ].. .the eight ships have
destroyed an exactly equal force and have remaining the
equivalent of 3.74 ships...
...if there be twice as many units on one side as there
are on the other, each unit of the force having the smaller
number of units must be twice as strong offensively and
twice as strong defensively as one of the hostile units.




Inasmuch as the displacement of a ship represents the
total weights of the materials composing the ship and borne
by her, the various materials could be segregated and
transformed into separate masses of such material.
Having certain definite quantities of the various
materials the question of ship design [is], ...in the
simplest form: "Shall we construct from these materials one
ship or two ships?"... if we decide to build one ship
instead of two , this single ship must be twice as strong
offensively and twice as strong defensively as one of the
two ships.
It seems to me that while it may be possible to make a
ship carry twice as many guns as one of half the
displacement it is, at least, debatable if she can be made
twice as strong defensively. The chances of hitting her
certainly are much greater and she certainly is not twice
as strong defensively against underwater attack.
Chase also noted at the time of his 1902 derivation that the
equations applied only to gunfire, and was shrewd enough to observe
"that sudden destruction arising from any cause whatsoever will
[upset the analysis but] have least effect upon the accuracy of the
results... if it take place near the end of the engagement. It
would seem therefore that the force inferior in gunfire should use
the ram or torpedo as early as possible." While he does not develop
torpedoes further and reference to ramming bemuses us today, it is
probably fair to credit him with an appreciation that a torpedo
salvo had to be modeled separately as a pulse of destructiveness
with a time delay to account for running time to the targets.
Chase foreshadows the Englishman F. W. Lanchester, and the Russian
M. Osipov, who rediscover (!) in 1915 the aggregate, greater-than-
linear advantage of numerical concentration when square law
conditions obtain. Chase's equations are more powerful than
Lanchester ' s in that not only force size and fighting power
variations can be explored but also staying power.
REFERENCES
Fiske, Bradley A., "American Naval Policy," U. S. Naval Institute
Proceedings , March 1905
Fiske, Bradley A., The Naw As a Fighting Machine . Annapolis, Md.
,
Naval Institute Press, reprinted with Introduction and Appendices
by Wayne P. Hughes, Jr., 1988. Originally published 1916.
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VI. SALVO FIRE EQUATIONS
FISKE'S GUNNERY "EQUATIONS". Developed and first published in the
U. S. Naval Institute's Prize Winning Essay of 1905 by Commander
(later Rear Admiral) Bradley A. Fiske in the form of tables of
results after l,2,3...n salvoes. Fiske' s salvo methodology
approximates the results of using a continuous fire model.
In effect, Fiske employed the finite difference equations that
appear below. He never recorded the equations that yield the tabled
results, although as the U. S. Navy's leading electrical engineer
he was fully equipped to do so. The relationships between the
purely physical effects of superior numbers, fighting power, and
staying power stand out more starkly by tabling the results salvo
by salvo.
Assumptions
1. Fighting power of the force (called offensive power by Fiske) is
delivered in discrete bundles, like salvoes.
2. In the force-on-force equations, the values of unit fighting




3. Fiske himself avoided such an assumption. Rather than assume, as
Chase does, that all ships on the same side, A or B, comprise
identical characteristics, Fiske finesses the issue by computing
the value of fighting power of the whole force, relative to the
staying power of the whole enemy force.
4. The attrition achieved by one side's fighting power in any time
interval is small, typically 10% of the other's staying power. In
effect, aA,, is about 10% of b,B
n ,
and vice versa. Not only is this
expositionally convenient, but it is also about what was thought by
naval leaders at the time to be the relationship between a
battleship's fighting power and its staying power.
5. As with the Chase equations, "Square law" conditions apply:
every engaged ship is able to fire at every engaged enemy ship, and
fire is shifted efficiently as soon as a target is out of action.
Force-on-Force Equations for Combat Work achieved by a salvo
delivered at any time step, n = 1,2,3...
A(b,BJ = aA. A(a,AJ = /SB n [4]
and b,Bn+1= b,B n - A(b,B n ) aA +1= a^ - A(a,A)
State Equation after exchange of n salvoes (adapted from J. Taylor
[1988, Section 2.10])
a.a^2 - (l-a/?^2 } = b,/3{Bn2 - (l-a/3)B 2 }
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Fighting Strengths: Identical to continuous fire:
If aajAo2 > /3b,B 2 , then A will win a battle of annihilation.
[5]
If /Sb,B 2 > aa,/^2 , then B will win.
Model-based Conclusion
Since the only difference in formulation between Fiske and Chase is
the difference between a continuous function and a step function,
for the small salvo effects that Fiske and his contemporaries
conjectured the results are similar and conclusions are the same.
For example, Fiske computes [1988; Table I, page 243] the results
for a force with an initial fighting power of 1000 that fights a
force with fighting power of 500, a 2:1 advantage. Each side's
power per salvo is 10% of its remaining strength. The larger force
will have 841 of 1000 units remaining when the weaker force is
reduced to zero. Using continuous fire, the larger force would have
866 units remaining. The smaller the fighting power delivered in
each salvo, the closer the result will approach the continuous fire
outcome. The larger the salvo power, the greater the divergence
from continuous fire. When we examine, next, World War II carrier
battles, the same mathematical equations apply in 1942, but the
single-salvo effectiveness is much greater, with detrimental
consequences to the advantage of the larger force.
Discussion . Bradley Fiske' s purpose was fully in the spirit of
"exploratory modeling" as I have described it above. He wished to
demonstrate the advantage of force concentration. He also discussed
the value of warship attributes of the big gun era: number of
units, unit fighting power and unit staying power.
Fiske uses care in defining terms. Offensive power having, say, a
value of 1000 on one side and 500 on the other, is
. . .of course, wholly arbitrary and some may say imaginary;
but, as they are intended merely to show the comparative
strength of the two forces, they are a logical measure,
because numerical; there is always some numerical factor that
expresses the comparative value of two contending forces,
even though we never know what the factor is. [1988, p. 240]
It may be, he says, 1,000 versus 500 men of equal average fighting
value, commanded by officers of equal value. Or it may mean 10
warships opposed by 5 like ships, manned similarly. Thus, Fiske is
acutely aware that he conjectures combat power which will perform
combat work on the enemy. Nevertheless he conjectures actual combat
power against a specified enemy; it is not designed firepower, nor
numbers of units, that is given form for exploratory purposes.
He supposes that such a fighting force inflicts damage "in a given
time that is proportional to the force" remaining. Fiske uses as
his example salvo firepower that is l/10th of the remaining
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offensive force, so that if side A has a value of 800 remaining, it
will eliminate a value of 80 from side B in the next time period.
Fiske's combat power destroys enemy combat power, not enemy ships.
This is a subtle point. In our terminology, Fiske treats offensive
power as aA in the aggregate. Although a is always associated with
a period of time such that a = bj/10, Fiske would say that it is the
enemy's entire bundle of remaining combat power , bjB, that is being
destroyed. Therefore nothing inherent in Fiske's formulation
requires a and /3 to be constants. In effect he treats aA as a
single variable. On the other hand, Fiske does not contemplate any
change in unit fighting effectiveness caused by changes in range,
visibility and such, but only change caused by enemy fire.
REFERENCE : Fiske, The Navy As a Fighting Machine , op. cit
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AIRCRAFT CARRIER STRIKE EQUATIONS. Developed and first published in
Fleet Tactics: Theory and Practice to show quantitatively the value
of attacking first with all air wings against an enemy carrier task
force. See Hughes [1986; pp. 93-103]. The objective was expository
and, much like Fiske, equations were avoided by simply tabling the
results.
Assumptions
1. In Form 1, the value of the striking power of a carrier air wing
is by convention the net value, after any and all degradations and
counteractions have been taken into account. A single carrier's
striking power, o or (3 , is the value in hits achieved by its whole
air wing, conceived as a single, concentrated pulse of power.
2. In Form 2, the value of the combat power of a carrier air wing
is by convention the value, in hits achievable, of that part of the
air wing which strikes, before the effects of counteractions by the
defender are subtracted. If some of the fighters in the wing are
retained for defense (combat air patrol) , their value appears as
counterfire, a 3 or b3 .
3. Damage to aircraft carriers is the only work or result from an
attack. Damage to escorts is ignored as of secondary importance.
Defensive effectiveness is not inconsequential but is imbedded in
other terms defined above.
4. Scouting effectiveness is implicit and is either or 1. If it
is zero for side A and one for B then side B alone attacks, and
vice versa. If scouting effectiveness is one for both A and B, then
an exchange of air wing "salvoes" transpires.
Force-on-Force Equations for combat work achieved by a salvo (air
wing attack) at any time step:
Form 1
AB = aA AA = &B [6]
b, a,
AB = qA - b,B AA = j6B - a ,A [7]
b, a,
Fighting Strengths
The fighting strength equation in Form 1 is similar to Fiske 's
Equations [5] .
The fighting strength equation in Form 2 anticipates that of Modern
Missile Combat (Equation [9], Section VII below), and is:
If a^A2 - a,Ab 3B > bj/3B 2 - b,Ba 3A, then A wins a salvo exchange
Form 2
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If b,/3B2 - b,Ba 3A > a,aA
2
- ajAb
3B, then B wins a salvo exchange
We now have to be careful not to overstate the value of superior
striking power, because the superior side may have overkill: more
than enough striking power to combat kill the inferior.
Model-based Conclusions
Form 1
1. In theory, the strength of an airwing's pulse of striking power
is an open question. In practice it is shown in Fleet Tactics .
Chapter 4, that Form 1 can be calibrated against the four Carrier
Battles in 1942 such that a = b, and /S = a, ( i.e., a Japanese or
American carrier air wing in action was able to put one enemy
carrier out of action, all things considered.
2. When salvoes (air wing attacks) are exchanged, the superior side
loses the square-law property of cumulative advantage. While the
larger force wins, it suffers more. When calibrated for 1942, the
results are the same as would hold for the linear law, which is
much less advantageous than the square law advantage of the
superior side.
3. The problem of representing salvo overkill arises for the first
time. When the superior side has more than enough striking power to
put the entire enemy force out of action with one salvo, the
mathematical result is that the weaker side has a negative number
of ships remaining. While this can be easily corrected formally by
disallowing combat work that is greater than the whole enemy force,
it is worth emphasizing that a negative value in a simple, expected
value model indicates an operationally advantageous margin for
error, which is in effect a surplus of offensive power to hedge
against tactical blunder or chance. In addition, "all ships out of
action" does not mean all ships sunk, so overkill is an indicator
of the amount of damage inflicted beyond firepower kill.
4. The presence of "overkill" circumstances is the beginning of an
unstable situation, which, as we will see under Modern Missile
Combat equations below, leads to problems both mathematical and
operational when missile salvoes are introduced.
5. For now, the most significant conclusion is that one wins
handsomely only if he succeeds in attacking effectively first, and
not by exchanging salvoes. This underscores the advantage of
superior scouting.
Form 2
1. To match battle results in 1944, Form 2 must be adopted.
Defensive power must be taken into account explicitly to obtain a
respectable fit with the data in the only carrier battle that year,
the Battle of the Marianas in June. In particular, U. S. fighter
2 3
defenses and AA gunnery had become too formidable for Form 1 to be
useful
.
2. Since counterfire is best represented as a subtractive process,
it also exhibits the possibility of producing a negative value of
enemy combat power: a defense so strong that mathematically it
would compute a negative number of hits. Again, the amount of
defensive overkill is worth knowing and within limits is worth
having, for it represents a hedge against unforeseeable conditions.
3. When the numerator of Form 2, say (aA - ^B) , is taken all
together, then it is a bundle of combat power that behaves the same
as the numerator (the striking power) in Form 1. But there is an
essential cor lication, in that the first term, aA, comes from the
attacker's ax. tributes and the second term, bjB, comes from the
defender's attributes.
Discussion
The central question addressed in Chapter 4 of Fleet Tactics is,
"How effective was an air wing attack in World War II? An air wing
attack turned out to be less effective than naval air proponents
anticipated. The pre-war expectation that a single carrier's air
wing would destroy more than one carrier in a concerted attack had
considerable influence on tactics, especially those of the UN. It
threatened to create the aforementioned unstable situation, which
made scouting and first attack vital to success. See Fleet Tactics ,
pp. 103-106. But one CV knocked out per air wing was devastating
enough. Using the MOE of this study, CVs out of action rather than
CVs sunk, in 1942 of 23 CVs engaged in the four big carrier battles
of 1942, 13 were put out of action. By November of that year each
side had been reduced to one operational CV.
The trend seen even by late 1942, however, was toward improved
survivability, of which the CAP was the single most important
ingredient. By 1944, the defense was so strong that it has to be
accounted for explicitly, and Form 1 is no longer adequate. The
value of counterfire—the effectiveness of CAP and AA batteries
—
has to be incorporated, resulting in Form 2. With Form 2 the pros
and cons of allocating air wing effort between striking and
defending become apparent. There was only one carrier battle, off
the Marianas in June 1944, but it is suffient to show how far the
U. S. had come in reducing UN air wing effectiveness and U. S. CV
susceptibility to damage. Subsequent air battles in the Pacific
were essentially U. S. sea based air versus Japanese land based
air.
Observe that the carrier is the combat unit of interest, and
aircraft are "expendable shots." The perspective herein offers no
means of computing how many aircraft should survive an attack to
exploit their advantage of reusability. In a refined model this
would be a required feature. But no refinement was necessary at all
to study the Pacific campaign, because aircraft losses were so
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atrocious. In each the five big carrier battles, the U. S. lost an
average of 40% of our aircraft and the Japanese lost 60%. Notably,
a large proportion of aircraft lost were on board a carrier, or
because the aircraft had no carrier on which to land when they
returned, or because they ran out of fuel before they could land.
The effect of attacking effectively before the enemy can launch his
own strike, even though not explicit in the equations, can be
demonstrated with them. Consider three carriers facing two, so that
A = 3 and B = 2. If A attacks first, A puts both of B out of action
with overkill. If B attacks first, B reduces A to a single carrier.
After B's first attack, if A then counterattacks, he cannot win by
either sequential attack or simultaneous exchange. There is a four-
carrier difference in the results of first attack due to superior
scouting.
What of an exchange of attacks? While A destroys B, he does so at
the cost of two carriers. If continuous fire is applied, A will
only lose a fraction— .76—of a single carrier. B is more effective
in salvo warfare because he delivers a massive pulse of combat
power before he is destroyed.
The consequences of an unanswered attack are enormous, not to say
decisive. Unlike in the big gun era when unanswered gunfire was
anomalous, in carrier warfare the overriding ambition of every
tactical commander was to deliver an unanswered, decisive strike,
after which the enemy would be too weak to respond effectively.
With Equation [7] we have built a model that will, with the
addition of terms for scouting effectiveness and defensive
readiness, be able to address the essential aspects of modern
missile combat for surface-to-surface and air-to-surface warfare.
REFERENCE
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VII. MODERN MISSILE COMBAT EQUATIONS
THE BASIC SALVO EQUATION. Developed in Fleet Tactics: Theory and
Practice to show the tactical consequences if a warship had the
combat power to destroy more than one similar warship with a single
salvo. The mathematical structure is identical with Equation [7] of
the Aircraft Carrier Strike Equations. But the new possibility now
exists that the striking power of a single unit may be strong
enough to take out several similar enemy units, with profound
tactical effects.
The salient result of the many-for-one assumption seems to be the
creation of operational and mathematical instability. As to actual
operations, Fleet Tactics . Chapter 10, concludes that all classical
concepts of force concentration are nullified when a many-for-one
situation obtains. Victory through superior scouting is promoted in
importance, and new tactics of dispersal and sequential engagement
become attractive. But Chapter 10 also concludes that defensive
power can reduce enemy striking power, in which case concentration
for defense makes sense tactically. As to the mathematical model,
exploratory computations seem to be very parameter dependent, i.e.
,
case-specific. In fact, case-by-case results of the computations
appear to be patternless and chaotic. This strongly suggests that
detailed m^jeling and computations will be misleading until a
clearer pa _ern of both the analytical and operational behavior of
the various attributes is grasped first.
Assumptions
1. The striking power of the attacker is the number of accurate
(good) shots launched.
2. Good shots are spread equally over all targets. A uniform
distribution is not necessarily the best distribution. If each
target's defense extracts an equal number of accurate shots, the
whole strike may be defeated, whereas an uneven distribution
concentrated against only some targets would put at least those
targets out of action. (It is easy to compute the correct
distribution when everything is known and control of fire is
perfect; but knowledge and control were never sufficient in the
past when targets were in plain view, and it is less . ikely that
optimal distribution of fire will be achieved in the future.)
3. Counterfire by the target force eliminates with no "leakage" all
good shots until the force defenses are saturated, after which all
good shots are hits. Mathematically a subtractive process best
describes the effect of counterfire.
4. Hits on a target force will diminish its whole fighting strength
linearly and proportionate to the remaining hits the target force
can take before it is completely out of action.
5. Weapon range is "sufficient" on b^th sides. In other words,
neither side has a weapon range and sec :.ing advantage such that it
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can detect, track and target the other while standing safely
outside the range of the enemy's weapons.
Force-on-Force Equations for combat work achieved by a single salvo
at any time step:
AB = aA - b
?







The combat power, PA or P B , of a salvo is measured in hits that
damage the target force, and is the numerator of the left and right
hand equations, respectively. Combat power achieves combat work in
hits. When divided by the number of hits a target can take before
it is out of action, work on the enemy is measured in ships 00A.
Fighting Strengths




A, then A wins a salvo exchange
If bj/SB 2 - bjBajA > a,aA 2 - a^bjB, then B wins an exhange.
[9]
These equations hold when the first term on both sides of the
inequality sign is larger than the second term. When the second
term is larger than the first, the defense is too strong, no damage
is done by the attacker, and a (not a negative) loss results.
Model-based Conclusions
1. "Excess" offensive and defensive power in the form of overkill
now have a significant effect on results.
2. Missile combat is force-on-force , so that we need to examine the
fraction of each force that can be put 00A by a salvo:
AB = aA - b ,B AA = j3B - a
?
A [10]
B b,B A a,A
Comparative effectiveness of the two sides can be seen by dividing
one equation by the other to obtain a Fractional Exchange Ratio
(FER)
:
FER = AB/B = (aA - b , B) (a ,A) [11]
AA/A (/3B - a 3A) (b,B)
When FER > 1 then A will have forces remaining when B is out of
action, and when FER < 1 then B will have forces remaining.
3. The fractional exchange ratio is unreliable when overkill
exists, i.e., when the combat power of either side results in more
combat work than there are enemy units to accept it. or when
negative combat power results because the defense of either side is
strong enough to eliminate more than the number of good shots in
the enemy strike.
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4. From Equation [11] it may be deduced that for B to achieve
parity in FER when A is twice as numerous as B, then each B unit
must have twice the striking power, twice the defensive power, and
twice the staying power of each A unit. This advantage of numerical
superiority relative to the other attributes seems to hold over
many if not all situations.
5. Experimentation with all other parameters shows no consistent
preference in favor of striking power, counterfire, or staying
power. Preference seems to depend on some kind of unstable
relationship between the values.
6. In general, instability is great when force combat power
(numerator in Equation [10]) is large in comparison with force
staying power (denominator in Equation [10]). If unit staying
power, a, or b, , cannot easily and affordably be added, then force
staying power can only be increased and stability restored by




Although further refinements to the salvo equations are possible
and in some cases desirable, Equations [8], [10] and [11] are the
basic form for exploratory analysis.
The unstable circumstance of very strong combat power on both sides
relative to their staying power argues under all circumstances in
favor of delivering unanswered strikes. First effective attack is
achieved by outscouting the enemy. Since scouting plays a crucial
role, we will build it into the next and final model.
The apparent instability and chaotic behavior of the simple salvo
model imply the limited value of studies using specific scenarios
and ship characteristics in any detail until the general nature of
warship attributes and their interrelationships is understood.
Studies tend to concentrate on the numerator, specifically
increases in single unit striking power or single unit counterfire,
without sufficient regard for the denominator, specifically unit
staying power and numbers of units. To avoid putting too much
capability in a single package of combat value, studies should
carefully consider the relative value of greater numbers and
staying power vis-a-vis offensive and defensive firepower, and do
so in a force-on-force context.
REFERENCE
Hughes, W. P., Jr., Fleet Tactics: Theory and Practice , op. cit
Chapter 10.
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VIII. SALVO EQUATION EMBELLISHMENT
ADDITIONAL TERMS FOR SCOUTING, DEFENSIVE READINESS, SOFTKILL AND
SKILL OR TRAINING. The basic salvo equations, [8] and [10] above,
treat attacks and defenses as full up or zero. By the introduction
of multipliers, oA and 6 A , on each side, values of partial offensive
and defensive effectiveness may be explored. Other terms such as a4
for seduction, softkill and evasion are also incorporated.
These terms enrich the analytical potential and flexibility of the
model. They also complicate and confuse our basic understanding of
the interrelationships, for we increase the number of parametric
attributes from 8 to over 14.
Assumptions
1. Scouting effectiveness, o A or cx B , takes values between and 1
that measure the extent to which striking power is diminished due
to less than perfect targeting and distribution of fire against the
target force.
2. Similarly, defender alertness, or readiness, <S A or <5 B , takes
values between and 1 that measure the extent to which counterf ire
is diminished due to less than perfect readiness or fire control
designation to destroy the missiles of an enemy attack.
3. Seduction chaff causes otherwise accurate shots to miss after
counterfire has failed. We assume that it draws off all such good
enemy shots with the same probability, a4 or b4 , against each. The
model also assumes that the probability does not change as the
number of defenders employing it are reduced. Evasion, by low
observability or avoidance of a weapon such as a torpedo, is
treated mathematically in the same way as seduction chaff.
4. Distraction chaff draws off shots before counterfire, thereby
reducing the number of accurate shots that must be destroyed by
counterfire. It is given a fixed probability of distracting each
enemy shot. Designated p A or p B , it is a multiplier between and
1 applied to (3B and aA respectively.
5. A force will fail to reach its full combat potential in part due
to inadequate training, organization or motivation. The degree to
which a firing unit or target unit thereby fails to achieve its
potential is a skillfulness, or "training," multiplier, t a or r h
that takes values between and 1 and is applied where appropriate.
E. Hatzopoulis [1990] is the first naval officer to think of this
straightforward way to reflect human factors in naval force-on-
force equations.
Force-on-Force Equations
Let a' = aA T Ap Ba be the fighting power in hits of an attacking
unit of side A modified for scouting and training deficiencies and
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the effect of defender B's distraction chaff.
Let /?• = o bT bp A /3 be the fighting power in hits of an attacking
unit of side B modified for scouting and training deficiencies and
the effect of defender A's distraction chaff.
Let b3 ' = 6 B T Bb3 be the hits denied to A by defender counterfire
of B, degraded for defender alertness and training deficiencies.
Let a 3 ' = 5 A T Aa 3 be the hits denied to B by defender counterfire
of A, degraded for defender alertness and training deficiencies.
Then the embellished force-on-force equations, including seduction
and evasion terms, are:




1. Both striking power, a' or /3 ' , and defensive power, a 3 ' or b3 ',
depend on good scouting. Concentration of forces (the number of
participating units, A or B) depends on effective leadership and
tactics. But force staying power, (a,A) , is in the main a design
attribute that is independent of the degree of success in scouting
and tactical concentration.
2. For exploratory analysis, the whole of scouting' s effect on a
combat outcome can be reduced to four multipliers, aA , a B , <S A , and
S bl that take values between and 1 to diminish each side's
striking power and counterfire.
3. Similarly, the effects of any and all "training" deficiencies
are simply inserted. This seems useful to know, however constrained
we are in quantifying t for ourselves and the enemy.
Discussion
As to explicit representations of own and enemy scouting, they are
very difficult to express quantitatively in the absence of combat
specifics. The mathematics of own scouting effectiveness is well
developed and robust; the principal failure is in marrying the
scouting and shooting process into a single system of evaluation.
In sharp contrast, the mathematics— indeed, the entire art—of
diminishing enemy scouting capability is weak and undeveloped.
Nevertheless the equations tell us how and where to introduce
scouting 's effect. It seems particularly important to include it as
a factor that degrades defensive power. Many things, including too-
strict EMCON, enemy deception and stealth, and confusion over
whether all enemy units have been detected and targeted, can cause
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a surprise attack, which in salvo warfare is likely to be fatal. We
don't know in most exploratory analyses what numbers to assign to
a and S. The vital point, which is that success in modern salvo
warfare centers on superior scouting, has already been made. It is
also worth reaffirming that the best way to soften the consequences
of scouting weakness is to increase the value of the salvo
equations* denominator with either greater numbers of units or
greater staying power per unit, or both.
Deficiencies in combat skill—what we have called "training"—are
also placed in combat context with the salvo equation. There is a
continuing undercurrent of emotional appeals for the enhancement of
organizational, doctrinal, motivational and other human factors
without specifying where and how the factors affect combat results.
The placement of t in the equations is apparently the necessary and
sufficient way to do this. It is not difficult in the framework of
the salvo equation to compare the value of money spent on men vs.
the value of money spent on their machines. Most importantly, the
equations declare that there is no such thing as a training bonus
or synergism. Our studies almost always assume the skillful
employment of sensors and weapons when we measure their designed
combat potential or estimate their combat power. When human
operators enter combat, they seldom achieve the full potential of
their machines. The most we can hope for is that they come close to
doing so.
REFERENCE
Hatzopoulos, Epaminondas, "A Modern Naval Combat Model," 1990
33
IX. SUMMARIES OF PERTINENT STUDIES
This is a catalogue and summary of fourteen studies or analyses of
simple force-on-f orce models of naval combat. It will be made clear
whether the study is for exposition, validation, application, or
the accumulation of historical battle data. Studies are reported
chronologically.
It is of some significance that all but one of the authors are
naval officers. Each of them had a keen interest in tactics and all
but one (Brian Galvin) had a proclivity toward science. Chase was
a lieutenant and Fiske a commander when they conceived their
mathematical models.
Rear Admiral Bradley A. Fiske. The Navy as a Fighting Machine,
1916, Reissued 1988 . Develops and applies the salvo equations for
the gunnery age, incidentally showing why the square law (called
the N-square law) was applicable at sea in the big gun era [pp.
241-245; 313-319]. Appendix C to the 1988 edition gives Rear
Admiral J. V. Chase's original development of continuous fire
equations for naval combat in 1902 [pp. 375-382].
Captain Wayne P. Hughes, Jr., Fleet Tactics: Theory and Practice,
1986
.
First book in which this study's concepts were explained and
employed. With continuous and salvo fire equations, it illustrates
the value and limitations of various attributes of warships and
naval forces. Contrasts how the phenomena—and so the mathematics
—
of concentrated combat power changed over time, in the age of
fighting sail, age of the big gun, age of the aircraft carrier, and
finally in modern air-surface warfare with missiles. Show that
naval officers saw empirically the square law phenomenon at work in
combat, so that it was naval officers who first worked out the
mathematics of concentrated firepower and staying power,
anticipating the work of Lanchester and Osipov.
Lieutenant T. J. McKearnev, The Solomons Naval Campaign: A Paradigm
for Surface Warships in Maritime Strategy. September 1985, NPS
Masters Thesis. Strategic and tactical aspects of the night surface
battles between the U. S. and Imperial Japanese navies in 1943-44.
Gathers information about the gun and torpedo firepower and staying
power of opposing forces, and timelines of the events in 11
engagements. Shows how U. S. prewar war games and fleet exercises,
concentrating on daytime engagements, served us badly by emphasis
on long range gunnery [pp. 105-138]. Shows quantitatively how UN
prewar preparations for night actions using salvoes of torpedoes as
the decisive weapon paid off in the early engagements, until the
USN learned to combine a scouting (radar) advantage with torpedo
salvoes in 1943 [pp. 139-141; 149-159]. Appendix A is a convenient
compendium of data from the 11 battles.
Midshipmen 1/c Keith W. Brzozowskv and Robert M. Memmesheimer , The
Application of the Sochard Ship Damage Model to World War II Ship
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Damage, June 1988, NSWC unpublished monograph. Develops simple,
clear relationships between number of hits by bombs and torpedoes
and the damage inflicted on warships from 1,000 to 50,000 tons
displacement in World War II. Compiles data for 78 sinkings and 98
mission kills. [See ENDNOTE]
Richard Humphrey. Warship Damage Rules for Naval Wargaming, May
1990. ORSA/TIMS Presentation . Draws from Brzozowsky and Memme-
sheimer, Korotkin, and Chesneau to develop probabilities of sinking
or firepower kill as a function of hits by torpedoes and bombs of
different calibers. Three noteworthy conclusions from the data are
(1) the wide disparity in the damage resulting from a given amount
of ordnance (2) compared with small ships, big ships were sunk or
put out of action by a quantity of ordnance that was in strikingly
less than linear proportion to their displacement, and (3) the
imprecision evident in even hard historical data from combat.
Lieutenant Thomas R. Beall, The Development of a Naval Battle Model
and its Validation Using Historical Data, March 1990 NPS Masters
Thesis . Describes the validation of this study's models using 14
battles from World Wars I and II. Battles are fought by continuous
fire (guns only) , salvoes (air attacks) , or a combination of
continuous fire and salvoes (guns and torpedoes) . Beall uses
survivability data from Brzozowsky and Memmesheimer to derive new
curves and adds an ordnance-damage relationship for all calibers of
guns. A valuable data source of past warship firepower, fighting
power and staying power. Concludes that the combat models are "a
fair representation of reality" observed in each battle. An
unstated inference is that without knowing the particulars of a
battle it cannot be reproduced, nor would a more detailed model
serve better. Beall is primarily interested in the combat -is as
tactical planning aids, and believes (as I do) that then limited
power to foresee a battle's details in no way nullifies their value
for tactical planning. The model shows the weaknesses of US2n
tactics at Savo Island, shows that even without surprise the IJN
had the tactical advantage against our defective plan, and suggests
(by the model's very nature) better USN tactics. The model also
could have shown USN tacticians why their cruiser gunnery tactics
were doomed against superior IJN torpedo tactics in the night
battles of the Solomons of 1942.
Lieutenant Jeffrey R. Cares. The Fundamentals of Salvo Warfare.
March 1990. , S Master's Thesis . Since Beall 's validation effort
ended with Wo. id War II, Cares' objective was to examine the model
of modern missile warfare with a controlled experiment. For his
"real world" he uses the well shaken down NAVTAG wargame in a
simulation mode (no man in the loop) . The test vehicle is a single
warship class in various tactical configurations and numbers
ranging from one-on-one to three-on-two. He "fought" 275 battles
with 1900 missiles exchanged between 700 ships. NAVTAG results,
both mean and variance, were compared with salvo model predictions.
The major departures were attributable to two things. One was the
friction of units in combat (called "entropy" by Cares) manifest as
duplicated targeting, and a "sump effect," (the maldistribution of
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the effect of defender B's distraction chaff.
Let (3* = o bT bp A3 be the fighting power in hits of an attacking
unit of side B modified for scouting and training deficiencies and
the effect of defender A's distraction chaff.
Let b3 ' = <5 B T Bb3 be the hits denied to A by defender counterfire
of B, degraded for defender alertness and training deficiencies.
Let a 3 ' = <5A r Aa 3 be the hits denied to B by defender counterfire
of A, degraded for defender alertness and training deficiencies.
Then the embellished force-on-force equations, including seduction
and evasion terms, are:





1. Both striking power, a 1 or |3 '
,
and defensive power, a 3 • or b3 ',
depend on good scouting. Concentration of forces (the number of
participating units, A or B) depends on effective leadership and
tactics. But force staying power, (ajA)
,
is in the main a design
attribute that is independent of the degree of success in scouting
and tactical concentration.
2. For exploratory analysis, the whole of scouting' s effect on a
combat outcome can be reduced to four multipliers, oA , o hl SA , and
S
ti ,
that take values between and 1 to diminish each side's
striking power and counterfire.
3. Similarly, the effects of any and all "training" deficiencies
are simply inserted. This seems useful to know, however constrained
we are in quantifying t for ourselves and the enemy.
Discussion
As to explicit representations of own and enemy scouting, they are
very difficult to express quantitatively in the absence of combat
specifics. The mathematics of own scouting effectiveness is well
developed and robust; the principal failure is in marrying the
scouting and shooting process into a single system of evaluation.
In sharp contrast, the mathematics— indeed, the entire art—of
diminishing enemy scouting capability is weak and undeveloped.
Nevertheless the equations tell us how and where to introduce
scouting 's effect. It seems particularly important to include it as
a factor that degrades defensive power. Many things, including too-
strict EMCON, enemy deception and stealth, and confusion over
whether all enemy units have been detected and targeted, can cause
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counter-measures do not necessarily reduce the bombers* damage on
carrier and escorts if they continue to close the range, but bomber
losses increase severely. Thus, the final choice lies with the
bombers, and the analysis suggests that the effect of
countermeasures will not, in all circumstances, reduce warship
losses to the first bomber attack but will very much reduce the
number of bombers that reattack.
Lieutenant Brian R. Galvin, "Punching Combat's Equations," in Naval
Institute Proceedings, July 1991 . An operations-oriented paper,
espousing the use of salvo eguations to organize tactical thought
aboard ship. Galvin is the first to explore the correct way to
introduce soft-kill counteractions into the equations, and does so
with his equation 3. As the Proceedings' lead says, "tne simple
tactical models of old still seem to work."
Lieutenant Aristomenis P. Lalis, Sensitivity Analysis of the Modern
Naval Combat Model, September 1991, NPS Masters Thesis . An attempt
to use mathematical manipulation and parametric values to derive
general lessons about the relative value of different warship
attributes One method is a "battle trace" developed by D. Barr, M.
Weir and J. offman [1991], which is the sequential use of the FER.
The second ethod is to take partial derivatives and examine rates
of change n a sensitivity analysis. Perhaps the most striking
result is t e absence of a clear pattern when two parameters of one
side's for: :, such as aA and <5 A , are varied and compared with each
other. Lai constructed tenles of results for many circumstances.
Hoped-for tterns of comparative advantage did not emerge. The
relative r antage of, say, superior scouting or defender alertness
seems to 1 very case specific, frequently depending on many or all
of the ci .instances modeled in the equations. To date at least, a
consister advantage of one attribute (such as staying power) over
any other. s not generalizable . Navy friends say why is this a
surprise' evertheless, it is a disappointment. A principal aim of
follow-c: esearch must be to seek patterns of advantage.
[The rincipal exceptions, already evident and so not examined
by Lalis. -re (1) the pervasive and general advantage of greater
numbers . (2) the often crucial need to attack decisively before
the ener an launch his attack in an exchange.]
Richard
j
phrey. Damage and Losses of Warships in Modern Warfare,
November ,991. ORSA/TIMS Presentation . Although ship damage and
loss data since 1945 is less extensive than that available for
World War II studies, recent data agree rather well with Humphrey's
previous Warship Damage Rules against which they are compared. Gulf
War results "were of particular interest for the demonstrated
difficulty in sinking modern patrol boats with air to surface
weapons. . ."
ENDNOTE For design study, ordnance-damage data should of course be
taken from the U. S. Navy's most authoritative source. None of the
37
IX. SUMMARIES OF PERTINENT STUDIES
This is a catalogue and summary of fourteen studies or analyses of
simple force-on-f orce models of naval combat. It will be made clear
whether the study is for exposition, validation, application, or
the accumulation of historical battle data. Studies are reported
chronologically.
It is of some significance that all but one of the authors are
naval officers. Each of them had a keen interest in tactics and all
but one (Brian Galvin) had a proclivity toward science. Chase was
a lieutenant and Fiske a commander when they conceived their
mathematical models.
Rear Admiral Bradley A. Fiske. The Navy as a Fighting Machine,
1916, Reissued 1988 . Develops and applies the salvo equations for
the gunnery age, incidentally showing why the square law (called
the N-square law) was applicable at sea in the big gun era [pp.
241-245; 313-319]. Appendix C to the 1988 edition gives Rear
Admiral J. V. Chase's original development of continuous fire
equations for naval combat in 1902 [pp. 375-382].
Captain Wayne P. Hughes, Jr., Fleet Tactics: Theory and Practice,
1986
.
First book in which this study's concepts were explained and
employed. With continuous and salvo fire equations, it illustrates
the value and limitations of various attributes of warships and
naval forces. Contrasts how the phenomena—and so the mathematics
—
of concentrated combat power changed over time, in the age of
fighting sail, age of the big gun, age of the aircraft carrier, and
finally in modern air-surface warfare with missiles. Show that
naval officers saw empirically the square law phenomenon at work in
combat, so that it was naval officers who first worked out the
mathematics of concentrated firepower and staying power,
anticipating the work of Lanchester and Osipov.
Lieutenant T. J. McKearnev, The Solomons Naval Campaign: A Paradigm
for Surface Warships in Maritime Strategy. September 1985, NPS
Masters Thesis. Strategic and tactical aspects of the night surface
battles between the U. S. and Imperial Japanese navies in 1943-44.
Gathers information about the gun and torpedo firepower and staying
power of opposing forces, and timelines of the events in 11
engagements. Shows how U. S. prewar war games and fleet exercises,
concentrating on daytime engagements, served us badly by emphasis
on long range gunnery [pp. 105-138]. Shows quantitatively how UN
prewar preparations for night actions using salvoes of torpedoes as
the decisive weapon paid off in the early engagements, until the
USN learned to combine a scouting (radar) advantage with torpedo
salvoes in 1943 [pp. 139-141; 149-159]. Appendix A is a convenient
compendium of data from the 11 battles.
Midshipmen 1/c Keith W. Brzozowsky and Robert M. Memmesheimer . The
Application of the Sochard Ship Damage Model to World War II Ship
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X. CONCLUSIONS
1. Terminology . For clear communication, unambiguous definitions of
naval combat terms should be agreed within the Navy and adopted. In
particular, "combat power" and "survivability" take on a variety of
meanings.
2. Own Attributes . The key attributes that bear heavily on success
in modern surface and air-surface naval combat are:
o Striking power
o Staying power
o Counterfire (defensive firepower)
o Scouting (detection and targeting) effectiveness
o Softkill counteractions
o Defensive readiness
o Training, organization, doctrine and motivation (resulting
in skill and referred to collectively herein as "training.")
No attribute may be neglected in warship design, peacetime
drills, or combat operations. While this conclusion is derived from
an examination of the phenomenon of modern missile combat rather
than from manipulation of the salvo equations, the explicit
relationships between the attributes may be grasped from the
equations, permitting the study of any element's contribution alone
or in combination.
3. Enemy Attributes and the FER . It is a fact of combat that the
attributes of the enemy in battle are coequal determinants of its
outcome. That his numbers and quality are a vital ingredient in
ship design which cannot be known during warship configuration has,
to say the least, complicated the design problem. The Fractional
Exchange Ratio (FER) is advanced as a robust way to compare warship
attributes in the absence of knowledge about the circumstances in
which a warship will fight, including the attributes of the enemy.
4. cj. Command and control do not appear in the equation because
they affect many of the terms on both sides:
o Scouting effectiveness
o Striking power generated
o Counteractions generated against enemy striking power
o State of training
o Even numbers of engaged units, A or B, are affected, because
it is a primary command responsibility to bring all forces to bear
in a battle while at the same time inhibiting the enemy's ability
to do so.
5. Staving Power Robustness . Ship staying power is uniquely the
ship design element least affected by the particulars of a battle,
including poor tactics. Staying power's inherent robustness
suggests that it should be treated with great respect; and
specifically with greater respect in U. S. Navy ship designs, which
have little staying power relative to other attributes such as
striking power and defensive hard and soft kill power.
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hits on targets). The other was overkill: an excess of missile
firepower which works to the disadvantage of the larger force in an
exchange. While the departures of model predictions from NAVTAG
results are not startling, neither is NAVTAG the real world, which
would be considerably more chaotic. Cares also develops some
thoughtful theory of modern combat and proposes three "Laws of
Salvo Warfare" which together are a theoretical foundation of the
basic salvo equation. This appears in Appendix A.
Wayne P. Hughes, Jr., "Survivability of Warships: the Historical
Data," June 1990, MORS Presentation . An encapsulation of the simple
ordnance-damage relationships developed by Humphreys and Beall, the
presentation is notable for a warm reception among the MORS working
group attendees, and the infrequency of such war-data-based
presentations in current naval operations research forums.
Lieutenant Timothy T. Smith, Combat Modeling Low Intensity Conflict
Anti-Surface Warfare for Engagement Analysis, March 1991. SECRET
NPS Masters Thesis . The first published practical application of
the salvo model. Smith drew on his personal experience on board a
Navy FFG during Operation EARNEST WILL escort of tankers in the
Persian Gulf. The analysis pits an FFG escort against differing
numerical and tactical combinations of potential enemy Fast Attack
Craft (FAC) . While the quantitative results are classified, it
should come as no surprise that single DD- or FFG-sized escorts are
in trouble against small FACs in modest numbers. Perhaps the
principal conclusion is that to win the FFG must outscout the enemy
with helicopters or other reliable search systems and then attack
very effectively first.
Lieutenant Epaminondas Hatzopoulos, A Modern Naval Combat Model,
September 1990, NPS Masters Thesis . Explores how to deal with human
factors that affect the outcome of a naval battle: scouting and
alertness, leadership, morale, and training. Concludes that while
the value of human factors will always be difficult to quantify,
the manner in which they affect salvo warfare outcomes is easy to
see and represent. Since a large body of opinion believes that the
subject of human factors is too intricate to model, the simple,
concise solution in the thesis is of more than passing interest.
Hatzopoulos compares and contrasts his approach for sea combat with
that of T. N. Dupuy for ground combat. But he does not deal with
the phenomena of command-control, which has an influence pervasive
throughout the model and very case specific, for reasons that are
summarized where Command and Control is defined in Section IV. Also
shows that the form of the salvo equation for hard-kill point
defense is different from area defense (SAMs and CAP)
.
Lieutenant Ray L. Snell, Countertargeting in Modern Naval Combat,
March. 1991. NPS Masters Thesis . Shows that the salvo model is
suitable for study of air launched missile attacks against surface
warships. With a combination of salvo equations and computer
simulation, Snell explores the effects of jamming and deception,
p B , to reduce bomber scouting effectiveness, a B . He finds that CVBG
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10. Warship Design Goal . Maximum fighting strength (i.e., hits
achieved during a combat lifetime) is the proper warship design
goal. Experimentation with all parameters except numbers of forces
shows no consistent preference in favor of striking power,
counterfire or staying power to achieve the goal. Preference seems
to depend on some kind of varying relationships between the values
on both sides in a sea battle. The instability and seemingly
chaotic behavior that is seen under many circumstances imply a
limited value of studies that use specific scenarios and detailed
ship characteristics, until the general nature of warship
attributes and their interrelationships is better understood.
Procurement and design studies tend to concentrate only on fleet
combat power, or even more narrowly on single unit striking power
and single unit counterfire, without sufficient regard for other
attributes. In particular, this study indicates the need for
attention to whole-force staying power, which is the product of
unit staying power multiplied by the number of units engaged. To
achieve balance and avoid building an unsustainable amount of
offensive and defensive firepower into individual warships,
detailed studies must be done in a force-on-force context in which
the relative worth of offensive and defense power is compared with
the worth of greater numbers and staying power.
11
.
Further About Staying Power .
a. The salvo equations do not embrace undersea warfare. It is
important to realize that design features suggested by the salvo
equations will understate the value of staying power, which when
present contributes uniquely to survival against torpedoes and
mines as well as shells and missiles.
b. In littoral operations the effectiveness of defensive
systems, a
3
and a 4 , will be curtailed because of short response
time, in which case survival and the ability to fulfill a mission
will depend more heavily on staying power.
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XI. RECOMMENDATIONS
1. Evaluate warship attributes in the context of force-on-force, in
which the quantity and vulnerability of the force are evaluated in
competition with unit offensive and defensive firepower.
2. Measure the quantity of accurately delivered ordnance over the
combat life of a warship or force. This is a force's true fighting
strength . Use this MOE to measure the contribution of an equal cost
increment, whether of additional ships or of an attribute within a
force of ships.
3. Use the salvo equations to solve the fundamental and confounding
problem in warship design, which is that one needs a vehicle for
comparison of warship attributes without knowing what battles the
warship will fight. Battle variables are not simply those related
to a scenario. Variability of outcomes is also related to tactics
and the adept handling of forces in the battle, and also to chance,
for historical results show wide swings that cannot be attributed
to the relative fighting strengths of the opposing sides. Salvo
equations are recommended as the best vehicle for exploratory,
front end analysis of surface warship attributes for strike, AAW,
ASUW, and some aspects of search, patrol, inshore warfare and
amphibious operations. ASW and mine warfare are noteworthy
exceptions
.
4. Use the Fractional Exchange Ratio (FER) with the salvo
equations. The FER is as a strong and well-tested, but abstract,
measure of the relative worth of warship attributes which can be
used with any appropriate form of salvo equation or a continuous
fire equation. The limitations of analysis with such an exploratory
model are well set forth in this study, but the salvo equations in
conjunction with the FER are a superior tool of exploratory
analyis
.
5. Conduct exploratory analysis first, and use scenario-specific,
detailed analysis next for corroboration. Complicated warfare
simulations used prematurely for exploratory analysis will inhibit
a basic grasp of the desirable design goals, because data for such
simulations is intrinsically unknowable. Use of the most complex
simulations also tends to restrict the analysis to that of a single
ship in a small number of tactical and parameter variations.
Engineering design studies with detailed models should be used
iteratively, to test feasibility of a design concept.
6. It is also recommended that the salvo model be used to explore
complementary mixes of warships comprising task groups. Methods of
force mix analysis have not been introduced in this paper. Complex
models and simulations have been strikingly unsuccessful at
deriving a mix of several classes of fighting ships in a force. For
various reasons, admittedly not all analytical in nature, the
tendency has been to derive one attractive class of all purpose
surface warship, disregarding the possibility that two or more
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cooperative classes are preferable. This is seen in the past
balance of battleships, cruisers, and destroyers, and in fact is
seen in the imbalance of past U. S. peacetime shipbuilding programs
which tended to concentrate on capital ships and neglect cruisers,
destroyers, amphibious ships and minecraft. The salvo mode... cannot
of itself determine a preferable mix, but it is thought to have
promise to explore many aspects of a mix, once one is hypothesized.
For example, lack of force staying power creates an unstable
situation which is very undesirable for a superior force when it
confronts a smaller one in an exchange of salvoes. The two ways to
reduce the danger of an unstable combat situation by warship design
are (1) to increase unit staying power, and (2) to increase the
number of units engaged. The first way is attained by buildir^ less
vulnerable ships with the same combat power. The secon: ay is
attained by building more numerous ships, some of which could be
lost without having critical conseguences to the task force as a
whole, and which could operate in the most exposed positions or
dangerous waters. The first category has the character of 1930s-era
capital ships (battleships, battlecruisers, and aircraft carriers)
that were seen as the backbone of the fleet. The second category
has the character of 1930s-era destroyers that were seen as
expendable. Historical design experience suggests that an as yet
untried mix of two classes might be superior to a single surface
warship class of present characteristics.
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APPENDIX A. THE AGGREGATION OF TERMS
A thoughtful reader of the assumptions that accompany each model in
Sections V through IX will appreciate their effects on computation,
among which are:
o The linear degradation of unit capabilities after hits.
o The uniform spread of hits from a salvo over all targets.
o The presumption that force striking power is the product of
unit striking power times the number of units; and defensive
firepower is similarly multiplicative.
The salvo equation expresses a dynamic process in a specific, rigid
mathematical construction. One way, perhaps the only way, to escape
its strictures and assumptions is to aggregate terms in an even
more abstract and primitive formulation. The value of the aggregate
terms can be whatever is experimentally "true," or best fits the
data. For instance, if we observe that the number of hits, a [2],
achieved by salvoes from two identical warships is only 1.7 of the
value of a for one ship, then the striking power of the two is not
aA = a x 2 but a non-linear aggregate value, a[2] = 1.7 x a[l]. If
one has experimental evidence for a [A], A = 1,2,3..., then he can
and should use it in the manner described below.
The theoretical structure that follows is adapted from J. Cares
[1990]. It is expressed as three "laws of salvo warfare." When the
laws describe the process, the general form applies. If and when
the particular conditions of linearity also hold (and in general
they would not for real combat) then the model forms above would
produce "true" results. If one wishes to deny the assumptions of
additivity, then he should retreat into the still more basic form
appearing below, using the laws of salvo warfare as guide. He will
have to have numerical values for the synthesized terms that the
laws imply. Finally, if any of the three laws themselves appear not
to hold and must be repudiated, then even this most primitive form
is in default.
The First Law of Salvo Warfare : Salvoes are interactions of pulses
of combat power with their targets and therefore are event-stepped
phenomena (not continuous processes) of attrition, in which damage
is propertional to the ratio of combat power to staying power.
Therefore we say the effect of a salvo by A against B is:
Losses to A = [Combat power of B] / [Staying power of A]
The Second Law of Salvo Warfare : Combat power is the attacker's
pulse of lethal energy minus the defender's actions to attenuate
the energy. Therefore we say:
[Combat power of B] = [Striking power of B] - [Defensive power
(or Counteractions) of A]
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The Third Law of Salvo Warfare : Combat power may be measured in
units of hits, staying power in units of hits per ship, and combat
potential and damage in units of ships.
Therefore, when the law holds, we need not be concerned with
maneuver or advantageous tactical position, or with the effects a
salvo might have to demoralize or suppress the enemy's actions.
Contrariwise, when the Third Law does not hold, the model is
defective. As an example, at the climax of the Battle of Jutland,
Admiral Scheer, the German tactical commander, in desperation
ordered a torpedo attack by his Third Torpedo-boat Flotilla on the
British battle line. The salvo of torpedoes achieved no hits and
damage "in units of [battle] ships" was zero. But the combat power
visible in the wakes of the torpedoes caused the British commander
to turn his battle line away, letting the German battleships escape
their awkward posture. The torpedo salvo's effect on Jutland's
outcome by briefly suppressing British firepower was very great,
even decisive in the view of some historians. When a combat outcome
hinges on effects of fighting power other than hits and losses (as
it often does in a land battle) , then the Third Law is broken and
the model is deficient.
A form of the salvo model with aggregated terms may be written that
is consistent with the three Laws. Both Beall [1990] and Cares
[1990] conclude from their research (summarized in Section IX) that
the following representation of Equation [12] is the most generally
satisfying:
AB = aAg TA1 - b ? fBl
MB]
The bold symbols represent the not necessarily linear aggregate of
whole Force scouting power, striking power, counteractions, and
staying power for the number of units, [A] or [B], attacking or
defending. This "four-element model" (Cares' expression; p. 25]) is
in force-on-force analysis really an eight-element model. Eight
elements with the flexibility to aggregate attributes in non-linear
fashion, are superior for a posteriori corroboration against the
experimental battle results.
However, for exploratory analysis to study individual ship design
variants, in the absence of battle data one has little choice but
to begin with the assumptions that accompany each of the combat
model forms.
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